



The opinion prevails in Washington that a Revenue Bill taxing again
as income the incomes reported and taxed during the War would be
constitutional, and among many that it would be an excellent method
for raising money for the Soldiers' Bonus.'
Such bills have been offered with strong support in recent sessions
of Congress and similar bills are likely to be pressed in the coming
Congress. The proponents of these measures base themselves on the
principle that Congress may legislate retroactively.
We all know that the vast stores of capital in the United States of
today are, with the exception of bare land, wholly due to the accumula-
tion of past income. A large portion of this must have been accumu-
lated since 1913. Such legislation therefore, if successful, would as to
all income saved since I9M3 and much that was saved before, effect a
repeal of Secs. 2 and 9 of Article i of the Constitution which provide
that direct taxes, that is, taxes on "accumulated property," shall be
apportioned among the states according to population.
2
And this amazing consequence would follow from the adoption of
the Sixteenth Amendment, an amendment which provided for no change
of that kind. That Amendment merely said: "The Congress shall
have the power to levy and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration."
Nothing was there said about taxing past accumulations of income
that had become capital. Nothing to show that this Amendment was to
annul any other part of the Constitution, least of all by indirection-
nothing at all--except what every one knew, that this Amendment was
designed to carry out the plan to have a complete system of Income
Taxation which had been frustrated by the Pollock case.3  The
Supreme Court in that case had gone so far in defense of these same
constitutional provisions as to hold that an income tax on income from
property was like a direct tax on the property itself and therefore void
unless apportioned.
1 See Foster, Income Tax (1913) 55-82; 59 CONG. REC. (192o) 6486-6491.
'U. S. Const. (1787) art. I. sec. 2. ". . . . Representatives and direct Taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included in this Union,
according to their respective Numbers . "; ibid. sec. 9. ".... No Capitation,
or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumera-
tion herein before directed to be taken...." 2-
'Pollock v. Farners' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 158 U. S. 6ox, 15 Sup. Ct. 912.
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There is nothing in recent decisions to justify the levy of an income
tax on accumulations of property-that is, on accumulated income-
nothing that goes beyond those decisions uniform and consistent in
every jurisdiction that an income tax law may affect the income of the
next immediately previous taxable period. This limited degree of
retroactivity, if it be such, is now laid hold of as authority for reaching
back five or ten years to-the incomes that have long since been spent or
capitalized.
In truth and in substance the question of retroactivity does not arise
in these cases. It is only the form that seems retroactive. Income
cannot be determined until it has been received. For this reason it has
been the uniform practice to enact income tax laws covering the current
period or the most recently completed period of income receipts-the
elapsed months of the current calendar year, or the entire calendar year
previously elapsed.
When the right to reach back and tax income accruing from March i,
1913, was questioned in the Senate in the summer of 1913 in the debate
on the Revenue Bill eventually signed October 3, 1913, Attorney
General McReynolds properly wrote :4
"The practice in the past, the necessity for moving along practical lines
with respect to tax matters . . . . are adequate to overthrow the
contention."
But when a Revenue law reaches back five years to a thing that was
once income and which has since either been dissipated or capitalized,
what is this but a tax on "accumulated property" and a direct tax
forbidden by the Constitution? Does calling this tax an income tax
and measuring it by what was once income but is now accumulated
property, make it an income tax?
Since the proponents of retroactive income taxation aim to extend it
beyond the limits of any previous application of it, let us consider the
two constitutional principles which they thereby place in conflict-one
or the other of which must give way unless the two can be harmonized.
The first principle is that Congress has power to enact retroactive
legislation. The second is that Congress is prohibited from levying
direct taxes, as on capital or "accumulated property" except in propor-
tion to population and by apportionment among the states.
The first is an implied power-implied from the very fact of
sovereignty. The second is an express limitation of power-secured
by two separate provisions of the Constitution-one positive5 and the
other negative.6 And if these principles really do conflict, so that one
' Mr. McReynolds wrote August 6, 1913 to Senator Simmons in reply to a
request by the latter for the Attorney General's opinion. The letter, together with
a memorandum on the subject by T. M. Gordon, a special assistant to the Attorney
General, are given in extenso by Foster, op. cit. supra note i, pp. 63-70.
'Art. I, sec. 2. See mtpra note 2.
' Art. I, sec. 9. See supra note 2.
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must yield, their relation to one another and the subject matter of taxa-
tion require consideration.
The Supreme Court has said :7
".... The power to destroy which may be the consequence of taxation,
is a reason why the right to tax should be confined to subjects which
may be lawfully embraced therein."
It is significant that the implied power of retroactive legislation is
itself in several ways expressly limited by the Constitution. Thus
criminal laws that are retroactive, i. e., ex post facto laws, are
prohibited." And so with bills of attainder. The right to pass laws
impairing the obligation of contracts is also denied to the states.
9
The chief object of retroactive legislation is remedial. Therefore
remedial retroactive enactments "are construed liberally to accomplish
the object, correct the evils and suppress the mischief aimed at."'1  On
the other hand, the rarely enacted other kinds of retrospective statutes
"'have always been subjected to such a construction as would circum-
scribe their operation within the narrowest possible limits consistent
with the manifest intention of the Legislature to be drawn from the
language used.' ""
Contrast this reluctant suspicious attitude of the Courts toward
retroactive legislation with the provisions governing direct taxation on
capital. The Constitution gave Congress power to "levy and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises,"'1 2 but it divided these into two great
classes--direct taxes which must be apportioned among the states
according to population, and "duties, imposts and excises which must be
uniform throughout the United States.' 2  The income tax, although it
be directly on income, is now regarded as in the latter class and an
indirect tax so far as the source or property is concerned.' 3
Chief Justice Fuller, in an historical review of the subject, has shown
the reasons for this classification.'" The original states had plenary
power of taxation.
"They gave up the great sources of revenue derived from
commerce; .... . They retained the power of direct taxation and to
that they looked as their chief resource; .... The founders anticipated
that the expenditures of the states, their counties, cities and towns,
'White, J., in Knowlton v. Moore (igoo) 178 U. S. 41, 6o, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 755.
Italics ours. See also McCray v. U. S. (1904) 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769.
'Art. I, sec. 9.
'Art. I, sec. 1o.
1 6 A. & E. Enc. Law (2d ed. 1898) 939.
Ibid., quoting Duvall, J., in Hedger v. Rennaker (i86r, Ky.) 3 Mete. 255.
'Art. I, sec. 8.
' Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co. (1916) 24o U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236; Stanton
v. Baltic Mining Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 103, 36 Sup. Ct. 278. And see Maguire,
Relief fromn Double Taxation of Personal Incomes (923) 32 YAIX LAw JOURNAT,
757.
'Pollock v. Farmers" Loan & Trust Co., supra note 3, at p. 618 et seq., 15 Sup.
Ct. at p. 914.
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would chiefly be met by direct taxation on accumulated properfy, while
they expected that those of the Federal Government would be for the
most part met by indirect taxes. And in order that the power of direct
taxation .... should not be exercised except on necessity and . ... so
as to leave the states at liberty to discharge their respective obligations,
and should not be so exercised unfairly and discriminately as to particu-
lar states or otherwise by a mere majority vote, possibly of those whose
constituents were intentionally not subjected to any part of the burden,
the qualified grant was made."
And in another place :15
"Nothing can be clearer than that what the Constitution intended to
guard against was the exercise by the general Government of the power
of directly taxing persons and property within any state through a
majority made up from the other states" . .'. . but this inequality "was
manifestly designed to operate to restrain the exercise of the power of
direct taxation to extraordinary emergencies and to prevent an attack
upon accumulated property by mere force of numbers."
Note the recurrent use here of the phrase "accumulated property."
What was this property supposed to be accumulated out of ? What else
possibly but out of Past Income?
And again the learned Chief Justice says:'"
.... The States . . . . varied in maritime importance and differ-
ences .... existed between them in population, in wealth, in the charac-
ter of property and of business interests. . . . So when the wealthier
States . . . . gave up for the common good the great sources of
revenue, .... they did so in reliance on the protection afforded by the
restriction on the grant of power."
The restriction thus referred to is this limitation of taxing directly
"accumulated property" or "accumulated income"--for the terms are
interchangeable.
If there be any real conflict here between the implied power of
retroactive legislation and the express limitations on direct taxation, it
is not difficult to foresee which, in the view of Chief Justice Fuller,
would have to give way.
But there is no such conflict. There is merely a confusion of thought
as between Income and Capital-an. overlooking of the fact that Capital
is evolved from Income and that the precise time when this change
takes place is not always clear. The Supreme Court has defined
Income :'7
"'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capitai, fromlabor, or both combined,"' provided it be understood to include profit
gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets."
" Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 582, 15 Sup.'Ct.
673, 6go (on original hearing). Italics ours.
Ibid. at p. 557, 15 Sup; Ct. at.p. 68o.
'TEisner v. Macomber (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 207, 40 Sup. Ct. 187, 193.
"Quoting from Straton's Independence v. Howbert (1913) 231 U. S. 39g, 415,
34 Sup. Ct. 136, 140.
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Professor Seligman's definition is : 9
"Income as contrasted with capital denotes that amount of wealth
which flows in during a definite period and which is at the disposal of
the owner for the purpose of consumption, so that in consuming it his
capital remains unimpaired."
All capital, excepting bare land, was in its origin income. What
we now know and recognize as capital was originally wages or salary
or profits or rents or interest or return or remuneration of some sort
for effort or for the use of previous capital. Income is continually
becoming capital. Accumulated income is capital. For purposes of
this definition it is important to fix the time when this occurs, or at least
its boundaries, because income that has once become capital, can no
longer be taxed as income under the i6th Amendment unless we break
down all the limitations of the Constitution-all distinction between
income and capital-all distinction between income taxes and capital or
direct taxes.
There is often no earmark to show what items of property or money
are income and what capital. A man's wages, his salary, his interest or
cash dividends, may be thus earmarked at the time of their receipt; but
in industry, and especially in large industry, the gross returns indis-
criminately include the return or repayment of the capital invested in
manufacturing the goods as well as the profits thereon, and in such case
a mere adding up of receipts does not show the income of the industry.
The greater part of these receipts is capital return. Hence it becomes
necessary to keep elaborate accounts and at fixed times determine for
periods that have elapsed, that part of the receipts which is the return
or restoration of the capital invested in materials, wages, and so on, in
producing the goods, and that part, if any, left over for profits or
income. But in either or any case, these returns thus constituting
income unless consumed quickly become capital.
In industry it takes days, weeks and sometimes months, after the end
of the year to compute what has been that year's income. Thus, sonie
of the year's income open to taxation may have become changed into
fixed forms of capital before the tax can be computed or levied; but
that is a difficulty inherent in the income tax, and this difficulty only
emphasizes the need in a true income tax of enacting and levying the
tax as promptly as possible and before the income to be taxed can
have been too largely changed in character.
It is for this reason that all our income tax laws and those of
England also have appeared to be slightly retroactive, if we choose to
call a thing retroactive just because one is incapable of action without a
slight looking backward for the facts on which to base action. They all
without exception taxed the incomes of the current period or the year
just previously elapsed. But they were all well within the period that
taxpayers required for a complete ascertainment of income.
'Incoty Tax (2d ed. 1914) 19.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
We borrowed the income tax idea from England. Her revenue bills
were regularly reenacted each year in the midst of the taxable period to
carry back to the beginning. This was the method of income taxation
in vogue when we borrowed it. Everywhere else it is the same. Most
laws are enacted to take effect immediately. How could an income
tax law take effect immediately if a whole calendar year (or other
taxing period) had to be lost before its application, and then another
period for ascertaining the facts.
"The income of the preceding year may be and commonly is taken
as the basis of the assessment. ' 20
"To tax is legal, and to assume as a standard the transactions imme-
diately prior is certainly not unreasonable, particularly when we find
this always adopted in exactly similar cases." 2'
When the bill which was signed October 3, 1913, taxed back to
March I, 1913, and when the Act passed February 24, 1919, taxed back
through the whole year, 1918, it is probable that few incomes for those
years had been fully ascertained.
Opponents of the retroactive idea sometimes themselves make
unreasonable claims. And so the claim that "when income is received
it immediately becomes principal" and can no longer be taxed as income,
is one of these. Since it is impossible to establish toll gates and make
all income pass through-these and pay on passing, we must allow a little
time for the ascertainment of the incomes of the latest taxable periods.
Of course, income paid is in a sense property-but it is only accumulated
income that has become principal-what Chief Justice Fuller calls
"accumulated property."
Just when the change takes place from income to capital may not
always be easy to determine. Border line cases occur here as in most
other matters for judicial decision. But the broad differences between
income and capital are known to everyone. And we all know that the
incomes received in 1917, 1918 and 1919 are no longer income as such
but accumulated income, that is, "accumulated property."
The "rule of reason" must be applied in these cases.
We might here appropriately quote the words of Marshall in Brozwn
v. Maryland,22 a case of conflicting construction between a statute and
the Federal constitution-a statute which taxed importers and a consti-
tution which forbade the states to tax imports:
"The power and the restriction on it, though quite distinguishable when
they do not approach each other, may yet, like the intervening colours
between white and black, approach so nearly as to perplex the under-
standing. .. . Yet the distinction exists, and must be marked as the
cases arise."
And he added almost as if referring to our case, that when the article
=37 Cyc. 81i.
'Read, J., in Drexel v. Commonwealth (1863) 46 Pa. 31, 40.
' (1827, U. S.) 12 Wheat. 419, 441.
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imported has become incorporated into the mass of property of the
country it has lost its character as an import. In other words, that
which could not be taxed by the state whilst an import, could be so taxed
along with other property after it had become merged in the general
property of the state. So we say of Incomes. Merged with the
general property they can no longer be taxed as income-but they may
be taxed like other property.
The rule of reason was fully set forth in Standard Oil v. United
States.23  There again, two constitutional principles came in conflict and
there again would naturally arise border line cases, a sort of twilight
zone for judicial construction. One of these principles was the freedom
of the citizen to contract. The other was the Police Power of the state
to curtail that freedom when it tended unduly to restraints and monopo-
lies. To decide these cases, White, C. J., said :24
"Thus .... contemplating. ... a standard, it follows that it was intended
that the standard of reason which has been applied at the common law
and in this country.. . . was intended to be the measure used."
Applying the rule of reason, it is seen that our income tax laws hith-
erto have not really been cases of retroactive legislation at all. This
legislation properly understood has applied only to current events, and
not to the past in any true sense of the word. For this reason the cases
upholding our various Revenue Laws are no authority whatsoever for
taxing as income what has really become "accumulated property."
The proponents of this tax appeal to certain of the decided cases.
Their leading case is Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co.25 That case held
valid the Revenue Act signed October 3, 1913, the act covering income
from March, 1913. White, C. J., remarked26 "and this limited retroac-
tivity is assailed as repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment and as inconsistent with the Sixteenth Amendment itself."
And in Billings v. United States the same judge said :27
"Again let it be conceded that the causing the tax for the annual period
to become due in September 1909 is to give it in some respects a retroac-
tive effect; such a concession does not cause the act to be beyond the
power of Congress under the Constitution to adopt."
And in the Brushaber case the Court quotes28 with approval from the
old case of Stockdale v. Insurance Companies2 9 where there had also
(Ig91) 221 U. S. I, 31 Sup. Ct. 502.
"Ibid. at p. 6o, 31 Sup. Ct. at p. 516.
' Supra note 13.
Ibid. at p. 2o, 36 Sup. Ct. at p. 242. Italics ours.
9 (194) 232 U. S. 261, 282, 34 Sup. Ct. 421, 424. Italics ours.
= Supra note 13, at p. 20, 36 Sup. Ct. at p. 242.
(1873, U. S.) 2o Wall. 323.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
been a similar limited degree of retroactivity in a tax law, a new tax
law covering income of the year last past and rectifying a confusion in
the previous income statute. The legislation was essentially remedial.
The error of the proponents lies in the argument that because the
courts have sustained income tax laws with a limited but necessary
degree of retroactivity, never exceeding the period for ascertaining what
the full incomes for the period were, therefore any degree of retroac-
tivity would be lawful even if it reached back to a time the incomes
of which had clearly become accumulated property.
They ignore the fact that time and circumstance may change
substance; that a difference in degree becomes a difference in kind;
that time changes imports taxable only by the United States into the
general property of the country taxable by the state; that freedom to
contract may become oppression and monopoly; that income may and
does become "accumulated property."
The interpretations of the Sixteenth Amendment by Chief Justice
White in the Brushaber case are pertinent. He declared that the
Amendment did not confer power to levy income taxes in a generic
sense, an authority already possessed, and that the Amendment was
drawn with the object of "maintaining the limitations of the Constitu-
tion and harmonizing their operations,"0 precisely what we are contend-
ing for here.
In both this case and that of Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.3' the Chief
Justice makes it clear that the Sixteenth Amendment merely takes taxes
on incomes derived from property out of the class of direct taxes and
places them with taxes on income from labor, the practice of the profes-
sions, and so on, in the category of indirect taxes no longer subject to
apportionment. It thus for the first time makes possible a real and
complete income tax, whilst "maintaining the limitations of the Consti-
tution" as to direct taxes.
But except for that he holds in effect that the Pollock case is a correct
interpretation of the Constitution with the Sixteenth Amendment
included. A tax on property, a tax, as Chief Justice Fuller said, on
"accumulated property," is still a direct tax and subject to apportion-
ment. And this is so whether this personal or other property may have
been accumulated out of income received before or after 1913. Nothing
else is changed except the taxability of all current incomes from what-
ever source derived. Income that has become "accumulated property"
can no more be taxed now than it could have been before the
Amendment.
The Court has more recently expressed itself in Eisner v. Macom-
ber.32  Mr.' Justice Pitney there said :
Supra note 13, at p. 19, 36 Sup. Ct. at p. 242. Italics ours.
'
1 Supra note 13.
(1920) 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189.
Ibid. at p. 2o6, 40 Sup. Ct. at p. 193. Italics ours.
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"As repeatedly held, this (the Sixteenth Amendment) did not extend
the taxing power to new subjects, but merely removed the necessity
which otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the states of
taxes laid on incomes."
"A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language,
requires also that this Amendment shall not be extended by loose con-
struction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, these
provisions of the Constitution that required an apportionment according
to population for direct taxes upon property, real and personal. This
limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and is not to
be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts.
"In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article I of the
Constitution (the direct tax clauses) may have proper force and effect,
save only as modified by the amendment, and that the latter also may
have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is
and what is not "income," as the term is there used; and to apply the
distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and substance without
regard to form."
What is this but the rule of reason?
And the learned Justice might have added that there is a further
powerful, practical need for recognizing this distinction between income
and accumulated property. That consists in the different rates of
taxation applicable in practice. We have seen income taxes as high as
77%, but it is rare that a property tax exceeds 2%. A tax of even
77% of one's income still leaves 23% of it to the owner, and his capital
unimpaired; while a tax of 77% of his capital means a permanent loss
not only of that much capital, but a pro tanto reduction of all future
income that might be derived from that capital.
Although the Income Tax must now be considered an excise or
indirect tax, it is nevertheless levied on income. The Sixteenth
Amendment so reads. The Revenue Law of 1921 in part II, secs. 210
and 21I, 3' says: "upon, the net incomes of every individual," and in part
III, sec. 23o,3 "upon the net income of every corporation." The
Courts so treat it. It was discussed on that basis in Eisner v.
Macomber.
Chief Justice White in the Brushaber case expressly said that the
purpose of the amendment was to prevent what he called "a direct tax
on the income" from being a "direct tax on the source itself and
thereby to take an income tax out of the class of excise duties and
imposts and place it in the class of direct taxes.11
36
The Income Tax must not be confused with those other indirect
taxes generally in use and upheld long before the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, known as business or occupation taxes or corporate franchise
taxes. In those cases the tax was always held to be not on the income
or earnings, but on the business or occupation or franchise, and earnings
were but the measure of the value of the thing taxed.
"Act of November 23, 1921 (42 Stat. at L. 227, 233). Italics ours.
Ibid. at p. 252. Italics ours.
Supra note 13, at p. 19, 36 Sup. Ct. at p. 242.
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For this reason in those cases the income of non-taxable property
could be included in the measure, income from state bonds, interstate
commerce and the like, which could not have been taxed separately, and
the inclusion of such income was upheld on the ground that the income
itself was not the thing taxed but only the measure of its value.17
But when the Sixteenth Amendment was in course of adoption a
genuine fear arose lest these same rulings should be applied to the
Income Tax and so interfere with the instrumentalities of the States.
But the Supreme Court said on this point'in Evans v. Gore:38
"Governor Hughes .... in a message .... expressed some apprehen-
sion lest it (the amendment) might be construed as extending the
taxing power to income not taxable before; but his message promptly
brought forth from statesmen who participated in proposing the amend-
ment such convincing expositions of its purpose, as here stated, that the
apprehension was effectively dispelled and ratification followed."
And in accordance with these facts the Court held a Judge's salary
to be non-taxable as income. -
It is therefore clear that the income tax is a tax on income, and those
other taxes are taxes on businesses or franchises where income is
merely used as the measure of value.
This does not mean that the income tax must necessarily be paid out
of the income itself. The income tax becomes a general debt of the
taxpayer like most other taxes, local taxes on personalty, for example.
But just because the income tax is a tax on income it becomes necessary,
as Mr. Justice Pitney says, 39 "to distinguish between what is and what
is not 'income' ... . according to truth and substance without regard to
form." The name of the tax is unimportant. And Chief Justice
Fuller said in the Pollock case :40
"If it be true that by varying the form the substance may be changed, it
is not easy to see that anything would remain of the limitations of the
Constitution, or of the rule of taxation and representation so carefully
recognized and guarded in favor of the citizens of each state. But the
constitutional provisions cannot be thus evaded. It is the substance
and not the form which controls ......
The proponents of this new tax would go through the form of taxing
once more former incomes, but this form ignores substance. For these
incomes have been speut or become "accumulated property" and a
tax on such would be a direct tax.
Congress tried something similar in its law of September 8, I9i6,4
"See Corporation Tax Law. Act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. at L. 1I, 112).
The constitutionality of this act was upheld in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (i91i) 220
U. S. 3O7, 31 Sup. Ct. 342. See U. S. Express Co. v. Minnesota (1912) 223 U. S.
335, 32 Sup. Ct. 211.
' (1920) 253 U. S. 245, 261, 40 Sup. Ct. 550, 556.
' Eisner v. Macomber, supra note 32, at p. 2o6, 4o Sup. Ct. at p. 193.
" Supra note 13, at p. 581, 15 Sup. Ct. at p. 689. And see PiLla. S. Co. v.
Pennsylvania (1887) 122 U. S. 326, 7 Sup. Ct. 1118.
41 39 Stat. at L. 756, 757.
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expressly taxing stock dividends as income, but the Supreme Court
having regard to the very truth of the matter, "to substance and not to
form," held a stock dividend not to be income and that the tax upon it
was a direct tax on property and a violation of art. I, secs. 2 and 9 of the
Constitution.42
The Court also took occasion to over-rule Collector v. Hubbard43
which had upheld the tax law of June 3o, 1864,"4 taxing stockholders
on undivided shares of corporate earnings never received by them as
dividends, the ground being that these were not income of the stock-
holders.
The retroactive legislative power of Congress cannot help here. For
the weakness lies not in the retroactivity, but in the fact that the
proposed law seeks to impose a property tax by calling it an income
tax. If .there were nothing to this proposed piece of legislation but its
retroactivity, it might possibly be made lawful-by complying with
the limitations of the Constitution.
Unless the Fifth Amendment bars the way, a law that would
tax again the incomes of 1917 or 1918, and recognize them as
"accumulated property" by providing for an apportionment among the
states in proportion to population, although it would go far beyond
any retroactive taxation yet enacted, might be sustained by the Courts.
But the power to pass retrbactive legislation does not carry with it the
power to override the express provisions of the Constitution. Conse-
quently, as the income tax is levied upon income, a tax levied upon
accumulated income is a tax on what Chief Justice Fuller calls
"accumulated property" and is a direct tax and void unless apportioned.
It will no doubt be argued that this proposed legislation would respect
the direct tax limitations since it would not tax the specific real and
personal property into which the incomes of other years have passed,
but only tax once again those non-existent incomes as though they
still existed. But of what comfort is this sophistry to the man, who,
having paid his income tax in j917, has saved $ioooo and put it into a
house, when he is told that although Congress may not tax his house, he
must be prepared to pay another tax on the $io,ooo of his saved income
which he has put into it?
While this subterfuge substitutes form for substance, it does worse.
It substitutes fiction for fact.
It may further be urged that the proposed legislation is not confined
to accumulated income; it covers the whole of past incomes, including
the portions spent or destroyed. But this fact can hardly sustain its
constitutionality. It would be enough to vitiate the whole of any
scheme of past income taxation, that so large a part as the tax on the
accumulated incomes was void as a direct tax.
"Eisner v. Macomiber, supra note 32.
(I870, U. S.) 12 Wall. I.
13 Stat. at L. 223, 281.
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In the Pollock case, the Court said :45
"If the different parts (of the Revenue Act) 'are so mutually con-
nected with, and dependent on each other .... as to warrant a belief that
the legislature intended them as a whole and that, if all could not be
carried into effect the legislature would not pass the residue indepen-
dently and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are
thus dependent .... must fall with them.' "4'
And taking those parts of past incomes spent or lost in business or
otherwise destroyed, a tax on these alone would not only be a legislative
monstrosity, it would not even be an income tax at all. It would be like
a tax exclusively on the buildings existing in 1917 and since burned
down-or like a poll tax exclusively on the men of 1917 who had since
died.
Such taxes could hardly be deemed to "be confined to subjects which
may lawfully be embraced therein. -4 7
But to exhaust our suppositions, suppose that Congress in order to
reach again the incomes of, say, 1917, should recognize the force of all
this criticism, and to avoid it, attempt to tax in two parts-one, the
part saved and accumulated, taxing this directly by apportionment
among the states-the other, the part spent, as an excise or sumptuary
tax.
Such a tax would present great practical difficulties, and it would
frustrate the original idea of the income tax entirely, for it would leave
nothing of it but its retroactivity. It could be paid only out of existing
property, and yet the rates would be based on the property one had had,
or on the money one had spent five, ten, or fifty years before.
If we consider substance and not form, such a levy would seem to
overstep the domain of taxation, and to be but a taking of property for
a public use without compensation or without due process of law, a
violation of the Fifth Amendment and perhaps of the Fourteenth. And
this confiscatory measure would have to be upheld not under any
express constitutional 'power, but by judicial construction, giving this
enormous scope to the implied power of retroactive legislation.
People write glibly about the broad power of retroactive legislation in
tax matters, yet it is astonishing how meagre both the enactments and
the authorities are to illustrate this power. These are almost entirely
confined to cases of remedial justice; like the assessment or re-assess-
ment of property which by fraud, evasion, neglect or undervaluation
had escaped its just share in the past.48
" Supra note 3, at p. 636, 15 Sup. Ct. at p. 920.
"The quotation is from Shaw, C. J., in Warren v. Charleston (1854, Mass.) 2
Gray, 84.
" Knowlton v. Moore, loc. cit. supra note 7.
48I Cooley, Taxation (3d ed. 19o3) 492 and cases cited; Cross v. Milwaukee
(1865) 19 Wis. 509; State v. Pors (igoo) 1O7 Wis. 420, 83 N. W. 7o6.
RETROACTIVE INCOME TAXATION
The best comment on confiscatory measures such as here proposed is
found in the dictum of Evans, J., in the case of Bank v. Covington
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"If the power to do this exist at all, there is no limit to it; and it
might illustrate the subject to consider the result if church property
now exempt should, as it lawfully might, be made subject to taxation in
the future, and not only so, but retroactively, for ten, or twenty, or
even fifty years back. Here would be a practical confiscation of such
property for public use. Nor does the court mean to deny that where
the law in fact imposes taxation upon property which, however, is over-
looked by the assessor or otherwise omitted from the assessment, or
some other step is taken which is faulty. the defects may not be cured by
legislation."
It seems hardly worth while to consider a sumptuary tax based solely
on that part of past income used up in living expenses.
Notwithstanding the fact that a business or franchise tax differs from
the income tax and that in the firmer the income is merely the measure
and not the thing taxed; and that therefore incomes from non-taxable
sources may be included as a part of the measure, it is not to be doubted
that even a franchise tax law which would use as its main or exclusive
measure non-taxable incomes would be Void.
A law that would so base a franchise tax on state and other non-
taxable securities, would be wholly void, and while interstate earnings
may be included with other earnings as the measure of a state franchise
tax,50 a state law that would base the franchise tax wholly or mainly on
the earnings of interstate commerce would be void.51 On these same
principles "accumulated or past incomes" being capital and protected
by art. I, secs. 2 and 9, could not be used as the measure or principal
measure even of a Federal corporation or business tax. Besides which,
retroactive franchise taxes would seem to collide with both the Fifth
and the Fourteenth Amendments.
Another consideration which forbids any new tax on these so-called
incomes of other days is, that they have all paid their taxes for their
respective years and their recipients have fairly bought the right to
consider the residue as capital and to invest it as such.
In Brown v. Maryland the state had imposed a business tax of $5o a
year on importers, which the Court held void as being indirectly a tax
on imports. Chief Justice Marshall said :52
"The counsel for the plaintiffs in error contend that the importer pur-
chases, by payment of the duty to the United States, a right to dispose
of his merchandise, as well as to bring it into the country, and certainly
the argument is supported by sound reason. . . . The object of impor-
(i900, C. C. D. Ky.) 103 Fed. 523.
U. S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 37.
"Phila. S. Co. v. Pensyvani, supra note 40; G., H., & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Texas
(I9o8) 210 U. S. 217, 28 Sup. Ct. 638; Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanair (1921)
257 U. S. 265, 42 Sup. Ct. I01.
' Supra note 22, at p. 442.
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tation is sale; it constitutes the motive for paying the duties; and if
the United States possess the power of conferring the right to sell, as
the consideration for which the duty is paid, every principle of fairdealing requires that they should be understood to confer it."
What would Marshall be likely to say today of a revenue law to tax
the imports of 1917 a second time after they had passed to consumers;
or of one to levy a further income tax on the incomes that had paid their
taxes for that year and become re-invested?
Looking at substance and not at form, if an income tax on the
accumulated income of years gone by is sustained there would have
come to pass as to the greater part, and an annually increasing proportion
of the wealth of the country, the danger of "an attack on accumulated
property" which the Founders tried to prevent by those two express
and explicit clauses in the Constitution.
The Government already has ample undisputed power of taxation
without encroaching on those limitations which protect the states. This
is seen in its financial success in waging the greatest of all wars and also
in the great sums it is raising today through lawful taxation. There
is therefore no occasion for a strained construction to sweep away
constitutional provisions upon which the states and their municipalities
principally depend for the protection of their means of raising revenue.
